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ETHNIC PARTICULARISM AND THE CREATION
OF STATE LEGITIMACY IN WEST AFRICA*
Gwendolyn Mikellt
I. INTRODUCTION
Many of the conflicts in Africa today are the product of political,
economic and social deprivations, rather than "tribalism." It is more
productive to contrast how African "ethnicity" was created in the past
and used in the present, with the ways that it might be utilized produc-
tively in the future to facilitate legitimate processes of political repre-
sentation. Much of the ethnic conflict and political chaos in Sub-Saha-
ran West Africa has roots in distorted processes of political competition
that began with western colonialism approximately one hundred years
ago. Colonialism abrogated existing socio-cultural compacts about the
nature of political processes, religious accommodation, and the repre-
sentation of groups within African communities and states.
African "ethnicity" was very much the outcome of the nineteenth-
century period of colonial conquest, when western metropolitan or
settler groups used force to divide, conquer, and then politically subju-
gate the African indigenous populations. During the decade of African
independence (1957-1967), elite politicians sought to negate and bury
ethnic particularism and ethnic leadership in the race to achieve "mo-
dernity" and universalism. Their rhetoric reveals that they and their
states were being buffeted by Cold War conflicts and global market
* Paper given in the panel on New Tribalism and Democracy: Case Studies, at a confer-
ence on "Religion, The New Tribalism, and the Future of Democracy," at the University of
Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma, March 13-17, 1996.
t Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace; Professor, Department of Sociology and
Director of African Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; Ph.D., Anthro-
pology (Columbia University, 1975).
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forces. Therefore, the received state institutions and processes were not
regulated by African cultural sources of political legitimacy and morali-
ty, nor by the principles of western multiparty politics.
Africans agree that they need the state to protect their persons and
their rights, and to link together their multiple cultural communities.
But in Liberia and Nigeria, "ethnic entrepreneurs" have emerged, using
cultural identities as tools to hijack the political process and garner
control and resources within the state. These two areas have had diffi-
culty attaining "democratic governance" because ethnic entrepreneurs
foment coups and civil war to stymie the process. The struggle must be
to find ways of structuring the state that allows equitable representation
for traditional leaders who have cultural legitimacy, for African Tradi-
tionalist/Islamic/Christian communities, and for urbanites and new
elites. These configurations must bypass older colonial-ethnic constructs
while allowing lower-level legitimacy to reinforce the state. This will
yield a new type of "democratic" state; but then democracy always
involves the adaptation of principles to local cultural conditions.
II. REJECTING THE TRIBAL VERSUS
DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
It is fashionable now to describe this era as containing a clash
between "tribalism" and "democracy." It is true that these new "isms"
are often described as wearing the cloak of "oppositional civiliza-
tions,"' but they are treated as the same old phenomena, nonetheless.
In this binary construction, tribalism is portrayed as the classic embodi-
ment of primordialism and particularism-attachments based on blood
and kinship, on ascribed identities such as 'body' and 'name,' 2 and on
shared beliefs and symbols. But, in contrast to the past, when Apter,
Almond, Coleman and Lipset believed modernization to be holding
sway,3 now tribalism or re-tribalization is portrayed by many as in-
creasing in parts of the third world. In essence, the descent into
particularism is viewed as a rejection of all that is universal. Isaacs
describes tribalism as "the refuge to which, in any case, the great mass-
es are retreating and withdrawing in the face of the breakdown or inad-
1. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1993, at 22-
49.
2. Harold Isaacs, Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe, in ETHMNIcrrY: THEORY
AND EXPERIENCE, at 29-52. (Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1975).
3. See David Apter, THE POLmCS OF MODERNIZATION (1965); GABRIEL A. ALMOND,
POLrICAL DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN HEURISTIC THEORY (1970); James Coleman, Moderniza-
tion: Political Aspects, in 10 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (David
Shils ed, 1968); SEYMOUR M. LPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION (1963).
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equacy of all larger coherences or systems of power and social organi-
zation. '
Conversely, "democracy" has been portrayed as a political system
which allows individuals to transcend their local identities and to maxi-
mize reason and self-interest by participating in civic decision-making.
Democracy celebrates "the freedoms and dignities of the individual, the
principle of government by consent of the governed," and in western
societies it uses the formal institutions of "universal suffrage, the po-
litical party, [and] the elective legislature."5 In addition, the role of
political choice in shaping democratic governance was seen as corollary
with the role of supply and demand in supporting market based econo-
mies.
However, reflection on events in Sub-Saharan Africa during the
1980s and the 1990s (civic strife, state collapse, and civil wars)6 raise
serious doubts that these troubles could be adequately described and
understood using the stereotypical concepts of "tribalism" and "democ-
racy." Anthropologists and historians who study African politics have
always had great difficulty applying these oppositional terms, even
when they were in vogue in the western political usage. They acqui-
esced to critics like Shils (1963) who argued that the focus needed to
be on processes of the new society and on the state, instead of on the
smaller cultural groups that anthropologists had traditionally studied.7
Accordingly, it was harder to hear the exceptional analyses,' and the
focus on linkages between these local and national realities atrophied
during the 1970s.' In the wake of global attention of the racial and
ethnic confrontations in South Africa, Coetzee argued that it was unfor-
tunate that anthropologists were not even included in the scholarly
4. Isaacs, supra note 2, at 30.
5. STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 8 (Frank Munger ed, 1987). Yet, democracy has
had to break away from its Greco-Roman roots: "representation as an idea grew up within the
imperial framework rather than in a democracy, and had to be released from the former." De-
mocracy, in THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 486 (1941).
6. This is true whether we speak of West Africa, or controversial areas like Rwan-
da/Burundi. See GWENDOLYN MIKELL, COCOA AND CHAOS IN GHANA (1992); THE FAILURE OF
THE CENTRALIZED STATE: INSTITUTIONS AND SELF-GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA (James S. Wunsch
and Dele Olowu eds., 1990).
7. Edward Shils, On the Comparative Study of New Nations, in OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW
STATES: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY IN ASIA AND AFRICA, at 1-27 (Clifford Geertz ed., 1963).
8. See Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Poli-
tics in the New States, in OLD SocI-rEs AND NEW STATES: THE QUEST FOR MODERNITY IN
ASIA AND AFRICA, at 105-157 (Clifford Geertz ed., 1963).
9. The exceptions are important. See K. A. BUSiA, THE POSITION OF THE CHIEF IN THE
MODERN PoLITICAL SYSTEM OF ASHANTI (1951); A.L. EPSTEIN, POLITICS IN AN URBAN AFRI-
CAN COMMUNITY (1958); MAXWELL Owusu, THE USES AND ABUSES OF POLITICAL POWER
(1970).
1996]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
reassessment of ethnicity in 1975.10 Today, it has become clearer that
global economic decline, structural adjustment programs, and the post-
Cold War withdrawal of western political presence in Africa have led to
a dramatic escalation of these phenomena we had casually labeled as
tribalism.
We must begin to accept these terms as misnomers. Given the
increase in authoritarianism and repressive governments in Africa since
the end of the Cold War, it becomes more difficult to accept that sim-
ple "tribalism" is reflected in the recent clashes between ethnic, cultural
and religious groups, or that "democratic" principles are being rejected
when such clashes occur. Now that CNN, BBC, VOA, and FBIS take
us into the heart of strife-torn areas it is more possible than ever before
to hear the voices of ordinary Africans rising above the din of state-
ments from autocratic presidents, faction leaders, military government
officers, and ethnic entrepreneurs. The mass-based voices question our
conclusion that the conflict represents simple tribal animosity, anti-
Islamic sentiment, or the absence of a value placed on the franchise and
on elected national government.
This forces us to reexamine the social history and terminology that
has supported our earlier judgements. Because we have mistaken "eth-
nic allegiances" for tribalism, and demands for "dual political authori-
ty,11 as anti-democratic sentiment, we have missed much of the com-
plexity of contemporary problems in Africa. Some of this complexity is
evident in the recent situations of conflict in anglophone West Africa
that I examine here: Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria. These cases show that the
descent into particularistic conflicts is sometimes symptomatic of a
subverted search for universal principles which can govern the interac-
tions of social groups in national life. The data also makes the case that
local phenomenon have a diverse parentage, and that global influences
on local realities have encouraged us to use our designated misnomers.
III. MISNOMERS: "TRIBALISM" VERSUS "AFRICAN ETHNICITY"
There is no doubt that ethnic/political conflicts are endemic on the
African continent. 2 However, instead of using the word "tribalism" to
describe these conflicts, it is more productive to contrast the ways that
African "ethnicity" and political culture operated in the past and the
10. J.H. Coetzee, Formative Factors in the Origins and Growth of Afrikaner Ethnicity, in
Ethnicity in Modem Africa, at 235-252 (Brian du Toit ed., 1978).
11. See Richard L. Sklar, The African Frontier for Political Science, in AFRICA AND THE
DiscIPLINts (Robert Bates, V.Y. Mudimbe, and Jean O'Barr eds., 1993).
12. Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of Nigeria, has written that "the continent is a
theatre for more endemic deadly conflicts than any other region of the world. These have had
devastating effects on African societies." CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRiCA (Frances Deng and
William Zartman's ed., 1991).
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ways that these were altered during the colonial period, with the ways
that they might be used productively within the African context in the
future.
The assertion here is that African ethnic loyalties (i.e., African
identities that have particular cultural characteristics and legacies) may
be used to facilitate legitimate processes of political representation. This
conclusion is drawn from the observations that African cultural groups
have traditionally moved in pluralistic environments, and that peaceful
and integrative interactions with others having different identities has
been common in Africa until recent periods. 3 Groups with different
size, economic strategies, and levels of power met and competed for
territory, space, resources, even the "state," but accommodation between
groups was the normal outcome. This history negates the use of the
term tribalism because it implies innate opposition and hostility be-
tween identity groups. The question to ask is what special circumstanc-
es were required to move ethnic interactions from accommodation to
conflict.
An ETHNIC GROUP is the term that Barth and other social scientists
have used to denote groups of persons who recognize themselves as
members of a group that has very particular characteristics, including:
(1) persistence over time, (2) shared religious, ideational, and other
cultural features, (3) specific forms of communication and interaction,
and (4) mutual self identification as a category distinct from others.
Although these are culture bearing groups, the content of ethnic group
culture can and does often change in subtle or significant ways over
time, often in response to the social and environmental contexts within
which the group lives, and the conditions of its interaction with others.
Haaland has pointed out the economic determinants in the ways that
Fur and Baggara ethnic identities shift in the context of life in the Su-
dan. 4 Therefore, anthropologists have stressed that ethnicity is a social
construct, which exists in the presence of other groups of contrasting
identity and characteristics. Ethnic particularism and ethnic boundaries
exist, but these are adaptive and capable of change, rather than static
and intransigent. 5
Changing historical epochs have influenced the nature of integra-
tive shifts among African cultural groups. But the integrative aspects of
African religions have contributed to ethnic amalgamation, rather than
conflict. The expansion of West African Islam, first through trading and
13. See Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, Introduction, in FROM TRIBE TO NATION IN
AFRICA: STUDIES IN INCORPORATION PROCESSES, at 1-35 (1970).
14. Gunnar Haaland, Economic Determinants in Ethnic Processes, in ETHNIC GROUPS AND
BOUNDARIES, at 58-73 (Fredrik Barth ed., 1969).
15. See FREDRIK BARTH, ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES (1969).
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then through jihads, also challenged African cultural groups towards
new levels of integration. Although Islam was first confined to the
margins of society, it was gradually given special functional roles and
structural positions, and finally integrated in particular ways within
African ethnic constructs. In Senegambia and Nigeria, the Malinke and
Hausa were Islamicized through conquest, but in Ghana the Muslims
were placed in certain residential wards of the city, and were assigned
special administrative and supernatural roles to play relative to mem-
bers of the Ashanti/Akan ethnic group. 6 Nigerian Yoruba religion was
so integrative that the gods of new people were added to the pantheon,
and even Islam was accepted and integrated. 7 Christianity proved
more difficult because of western missionary refusal to allow integra-
tion, but after independence, Christianity too became a medium for
inter-ethnic amalgamation. 8 This integration belies the stereotypical
notions of conflicts between religions such as Islam or Christianity and
traditional culture as endemic rather than constructed.
IV. ETHNIC CONFLICT UNDER COLONIALISM
Many of the present situations of ethnic conflict, political chaos,
and state disintegration in West Africa have their roots in distorted pro-
cesses of political competition that began with western colonialism
approximately one hundred years ago. What we now call African "eth-
nicity" was very much the outcome of the nineteenth-century period of
colonial conquest, when western metropolitan or settler groups used
force to divide, conquer, and then politically subjugate the African
indigenous populations. In essence, colonial policy subverted the politi-
cal and cultural legitimacy of both strong and weaker ethnic groups. 9
I have argued that it did so by abrogating the existing sociocultural
compacts2 about the nature of political processes, religious accommo-
16. See SHAFFER & COOPER, MANDINKO: A MUSLIM HOLY LAND (1987); M.G. SMITH,
GOVERNMENT IN ZAUZAU (1965); R.S. RATTRAY, ASHANTI LAW AND CONSTITUTION (1927).
17. See Peter C. Lloyd, The Yoruba, in PEOPLES OF AFRICA (James Gibbs ed., 1965); J. S.
TRIMMINGHAM, ISLAM IN EAST AFRICA (1964).
18. See BENETrA JULES-ROSETrE, THE NEW RELIGIONS OF AFRICA (1977); ENID
SCHILDKROUT, PEOPLE OF THE ZONGO: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ETHNIC IDENTITIES IN GHA-
NA (1978); BENJAMIN RAY, AFRICAN RELIGION: SYMBOL AND ACTION (1982).
19. See articles in AFRICAN POLIcs AND SOCIETY: THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIETIES IN
TRANSITION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (Irving Leoiard Markovitz ed., 1970). These include
Jean Suret-Canale, The End of Chieftaincy in Guinea, at 96-117; Norman Miller, The Survival
of Traditional Leadership, at 118-133; Elliott P. Skinner, The Paradox of Rural Leadership, at
134-137.
20. This is my own term for the symbolic and verbal understandings between constituent
groups (familial, ethnic, religious, occupational, and gender) that made up an African political
community. See G. Mikell, African Women's Rights Within the Context of Systemic Conflict, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 89TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
[Vol. 4:1
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dation,2" and the representation of groups within African communities
and states. Thus, colonial policies forced individuals to respond to
norms which promoted individual or western interests often to the ex-
clusion of ethnic communal interests.
Emerging African scholarly data as well as newer western histori-
cal material now accept the economic and imperial motives for the
European colonization of Africa as assuming priority over religious and
social ones. These political economy priorities necessitated the inter-
ruption of existing African sociopolitical relationships when they inter-
fered with British, French, or Portuguese territorial interests as set out
by the 1885 Berlin Conference. Therefore, the policy of "divide and
conquer" resulted in the subversion of ethnic alliances within pre-colo-
nial West African states and the instigation of wars between neighbor-
ing ethnic groups that had hitherto had peaceful relations. The British
policy of "Indirect Rule" was effected through a modified and subordi-
nated hierarchy of African ethnic leaders, while the French policy of
"Assimilation" separated the educated and literate Africans from rural
and illiterate ones.22
Much of the existing tension between traditionalist, Islamic and
Christian communities also derived from colonial policiesY During
earlier periods, Islamic groups and other African ethnic groups sought
cultural, familial, and political accommodations which resulted in some
cultural assimilation,24 but this was made more difficult by the Europe-
an presence after the mid-1800s. In West African areas newly coming
under French colonialism, the southward jihads of Usman dan Fodio in
Nigeria, al-Hadji Umar Tal in Senegal, and Samory Toure in Guinea
and Cote d'Ivoire, was intended to allow Muslims to conquer and con-
vert local people before the French could take power. 5 These jihads
LAW, at 490-500 (April 5-8, 1995); G. Mikell, Introduction, in AFRICAN FEMINISM: WOMEN
AND THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL (forthcoming 1996).
21. See John Paden, Ethnic Pluralism, Integration, and Adaptation of Communal Identity in
Kano, Nigeria, in FROM TRIBE TO NATION IN AFRICA at 242-270 (Ronald Cohen & John
Middleton eds., 1970).
22. See A. ADU BOAHEN, AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON COLONIALISM 59-63 (1987); Michael
Crowder, Indirect Rule: French and British Style, in AFRICAN POLmics AND SOCIETY at 26-36
(Irving Leonard Markovitz ed., 1970). See generally Immanuel Wallerstein, THE ROAD TO
INDEPENDENCE: GHANA AND THE IVORY COAST (1964).
23. See F.K. Ekechi, Colonialism and Christianity in West Africa: The Igbo Case, in 12
JOURNAL OF AFRICAN HISTORY, at 103-116 (1971); S.K. ODAMTTEN, THE MISSIONARY FACTOR
IN GHANA'S DEVELOPMENT, 1820-1880 (1978).
24. See Simon P. X. Battestini, Muslim Influences on West African Literature and Culture,
7 JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF MUSLIM MINORITY AFFAIRS 476-502 (July 1986).
25. See Barbara Callaway & Lucy Creevey, The Islamic Encounter, in THE HERITAGE OF
ISLAM: WOMEN, RELIGION, AND POLITICS IN WEST AFRICA, at 9-27 (1994). See also MIKELL,
supra note 6, at 81 end. 59 (1992).
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triggered waves of southern and coastal migration that introduced new
tensions with southern ethnic groups involving competition over rights
to land, and over the role of Islamic political leadership in local culture.
Given that the centers of colonial administration lay more in the south
and coastal areas of the colonies than in the north, colonial policy
heightened concerns about whether northern newcomers were more
recognized by the colonial regime than leaders of older, traditional and
less centralized communities.
The Islamic/traditionalist tension was also heightened by colonial
attempts to use dominant ethnic groups to control "lesser ones" (Indi-
rect Rule), as well as the attempt to offset the power of former domi-
nant groups by using marginal ethnic groups in the construction of
colonial institutions. Migrant traders from other territories often had
more flexibility to operate than indigenous entrepreneurs, who were
perceived as ultimately posing a challenge to local European
mercantilists. In Ghana, Chiefs of the Asante Confederacy were first
suppressed by colonial governors, then as self-government approached,
they were allowed to reassume the political power they held upon the
eve of colonial conquest. This development not only instigated upheaval
within the nationalist movement, but also gave incentive to the creation
of a political party which was Asante, elite, and business based, and
which competed with Nkrumah's amalgamation of middle class leaders
for control over the independence process. 6 In Ghana, where ethnic
conflicts since Independence have been few, ethnic confrontations usu-
ally involved resources. The two most potent ethnic conflicts have
involved the 1968 expulsion of migrant (mostly Muslim) traders and
"strangers" who were perceived as exploiting the already fragile econo-
my, and the 1994 tensions in the North of Ghana, involving a colonially
created "paramount chiefship" that allegedly gave newcomers greater
political voice than the acephalous indigenous people.27 Yet these dif-
ficulties did not endanger ethnic participation in national political pro-
cesses.
In Nigeria, colonial policies widened the divisions between the
Yoruba, the Hausa/Fulani, and the Igbo, the three major ethnic groups
within the country. Ironically, the tensions over Fulani conquest of the
northern and southern areas had abated, and both Hausa and some
sections of the Yoruba had converted to Islam. However, the eth-
26. See DENNIS AusTiN, POLITICS IN GHANA, 1946-1960 (1970); JOHN FrrcH & MARY
OPPENHEIMER, GHANA: END OF AN ILLUSION (1966).
27. See N.O. Addo, The Alien's Compliance Law of 1968, in GHANA JOURNAL OF SOCIOL-
OOY (1969); Ghana: Government Negotiating Team Tours Conflict Areas in North, (Foreign
Broadcasts Intelligence Service February 14, 1996 (FBIS-AFR-96-031, p. 25)); Ghana: North
Versus North, in 36 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, at 4 end. 14 (July 7, 1995).
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nic/religious tensions were revived and re-energized by colonial policies
which favored the coastal Christianizing mercantilist Igbo communities
and the increasingly educated and cosmopolitan southern Yoruba who
were becoming state bureaucrats. But northern Hausa/Fulani communi-
ties were marginalized because they were required to operate within
retained Islamic political communities and under the leadership of
Emirs. Ethnic tensions between a numerically dominant Muslim North
and an educated but numerically subordinate South were moderated as
long as the economy of the post-independence state was growing, and
as long as parliamentary strategies for equitable political representation
of ethnic areas seemed to be working. However, with economic decline
in 1966 onward, the stage was set for the first Nigerian coup by Gener-
al Ironsi, and for the 1966 civil war in which the Yoruba and Northern-
ers fought to retain the secessionist Igbo Eastern Region where the
country's oil resources were located.28 Such conflicts tell us much
about the ability of economic shortage to fuel nascent ethnic grievances.
Nor were Ghana and Nigeria alone in having such experiences. Kenya,
Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi as well as many other countries have
gone though these conflicts as their country sought economic and politi-
cal stability after independence. 9
V. DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET
Today, the greatest stimulus to new conflicts may be the many
economic, political, and social deprivations felt by different ethnic
communities within African states. African colonial economies were
designed to maximize the export of primary products (agricultural) for
western industrial production, so there was a government bureaucracy
in place, but little sectoral integration, industrial development, or indig-
enous capital investment." There is no question that those strata which
were in privileged positions at the end of the colonial period were well-
placed to continue their dominance after independence. But most Af-
rican countries came to independence with inadequate institutions for
redesigning and managing the economy, and with no roadmap for creat-
ing more equitable ethnic representation in governance. Although elite
28. See JOHN DE ST. JORRE, THE BROTHERS' WAR: BIAFRA AND NIGERIA (1969); ARTHUR
AGWUNCHA NWANKWO & SAMUEL UDONCHUKWU IFEJIKA, BIAFRA: THE MAKING OF A NA-
TION (1970).
29. See AUSTIN, supra note 26; Ali A. Mazrui, Ethnic Tensions and Political Stratification
in Uganda, in ETHNICITY IN MODERN AFRICA, at 47-68 (Brian M. du Toit ed., 1978).
30. See G. Mikell, COCOA AND CHAOS IN GHANA (1992); Robert Bates, The Commercial-
ization of Agriculture and the Rise of Rural Political Protest, in ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF RURAL AFRICA, at 92-104 (1983); African Debt and Financing, in 5 INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS SPECIAL REPORT 2 (Carol Lancaster and John Williamson
eds., May 1986).
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politicians sought to negate and bury ethnic particularism and ethnic
leadership in the race to achieve "modernity" and universalism, the
evidence shows that they and their states were being buffeted by Cold
War conflicts and global market forces. Some have argued that African
economies did not and do not now offer the conditions which will
defuse ethnic competitions and support democratic development.
Nigeria provides a classic case of conflict under conditions of
scarcity where the state, after independence, has been seen as the major
resource and is therefore the object of intense ethnic competition.3"
Nigeria watchers have noted that the ethnic alliances which formed and
reformed after 1960 usually had the western Yoruba area at its center.
They note, for example: "[the] dominance of the industrial and service
sectors of Nigeria's economy by those located in the Lagos-Ibadan-
Abeokuta triangle, who are, of course Yoruba."32 But the popularly
perceived outcome of ethnic and political competitions after 1960 was a
Yoruba dominance over industrial power, Northern (muslim) dominance
in political power, and Ibo attempts at dominance over the oil resources
in the Eastern region. As shifts have occurred in the global economy,
and the terms of trade for Nigerian cocoa and other primary product
exports have declined, this ethnic-cum-economic competition has been
politically volatile, and has fueled military coups, repression, and politi-
cal instability. The military, under varying ethnic leadership, has ruled
Nigeria for over twenty five of the thirty five years since independence.
The tensions undergirding the 1993 coup of Sani Abacha and his
subsequent jailing of the apparent winner of the Presidential elections
(Moshud Abiola, a Yoruba millionaire newspaperman) are but the most
recent manifestations of ethnic political conflict. 33 The irony is that in
the 1993 elections, ethnic tensions had abated sufficiently for the public
to support the election of a candidate who appeared to be pro-demo-
31. See Richard Joseph, Class, State, and Pre-bendal Politics in Nigeria, in 21 JOURNAL OF
COMMONWEALTH AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS, at 21-38, (1983); E. Gyimah-Boadi, State En-
terprises Divestiture: Recent Ghanaian Experiences, in GHANA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
RECOVERY, at 193-209 (Donald Rothchild ed.).
32. Jean Herskovits, CENTER FOR CONCERN, Memorandum dated February 2, 1996, at 4-5.
33. Coups and changes of government have been those of: 1960, First Republic; coup Janu-
ary 15, 1966 (Gen. Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi-Ibo) (the Biafran Civil War intervened); coup July
29, 1966 (Col. Yakubu Gowon-Christian Yoruba); coup July 1975 (Gen. Murtala Muhammad, a
Hausa northerner who was assassinated, and replaced by Gen. Olesegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba)
(Obasanjo made a transition to civilian rule in 1979-econd Republic-but the civilian regime
became entangled in oil intrigues, and left the country in debt); coup Dec. 31, 1983 (Major
Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, a Hausa-Fulani northerner); coup August 27, 1985 (Gen. Babangida,
a Gwari Muslim) (on June 12, 1993, the Presidential election of Moshud Abiola, a Yoruba, was
aborted by Babangida, and a quasi-civilian regime installed); coup November 1993 (Gen. Sani




cratic, without regard for ethnic identity. The public anger, "ethnic-
baiting" and fear which was fanned by the Abacha regime after the
election annulment and coup now make such ethnic alliances more
improbable. Abacha's military clique appear even more reluctant to turn
over power to civilians, although local elections and a timetable for
national elections have been offered. The threat of U.S. oil sanctions
does not move them, because they find the threat to be without teeth.
The issue is that without economic alternatives for military elites in
power, without sufficient western pressure or sanctions, and given the
fear of ethnic reprisals for the fate of potential President Abiola, and
former Presidents Babangida, and Obasanjo, there has been little incen-
tive for the regime to civilianize. Indeed, it has been speculated that
Nigeria's support for the peace process in Liberia through its role in
ECOMOG gives Abacha a regionally democratic mask behind which to
hide.34
The link between the market and democracy is a strong one, and
continues to fuel ethnic tensions in Nigeria. Abacha has cleverly engi-
neered "zero-party elections" in which people are allowed to achieve
local representation but little influence over national political decision
making.35 On the one hand, many in Nigeria and elsewhere say that
these struggles over control of the state are alienating to the public, and
only further fuel the popular retreat from the state.36 Can there be de-
mocracy if no one comes out to vote? On the other hand, many pro-
human rights groups, and "pro-democracy" forces say that they wish for
the political strength and financial support which would make it possi-
ble for them to carry a credible candidate to an election win. Must one
be a millionaire like Abiola in order to succeed in "democratic elec-
tions" or must one always have the backing of strong ethnic (Yoruba or
Northern) financiers?
VI. ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURS AND CIVIL WAR
Africans agree that they need the state to protect their rights and to
link together their multiple cultural communities. But African States
have a peculiar history and vulnerability because of their colonial heri-
tage and their relative youth. They have been alternatively characterized
34. ECOMOG is ECOWAS' military monitoring group in Liberia from September 1990
until present. See interview by G. Mikell with pro-democratic, women's and peace groups, in
Lagos, Kaduna, Zaria and Kano (Between June 14, 1996 and June 21, 1996). See also ECO-
NOrMC INTELLIGENCE UNIT, ElU Country Profile, Nigeria 1996-97, at 9.
35. See Nigeria: The Transition Process, WEST AFRICA 185 (February 5-11, 1996); and
Nigeria: Transition in High Gear, WEST AFRICA 263 (February 19-25, 1996).
36. Claude Ake, The Future of the State in Africa, in 6 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE
REVIEW, at 105-114. See also G. Mikell, Peasant Politicization and Economic Recuperation:
Local and National Dilemmas, in 27 J. MOD. AFR. STUD., at 455-478 (1989).
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as "irrelevant states," "third-wave democracies," "failed states," "soft
states," "pre-bendal states," and "post-colonial states."" But areas like
Liberia and Nigeria have undergone ethnic conflict and civil war not
because of "tribal animosities," but because groups have never been
able to reconstruct their sociocultural compacts in the aftermath of colo-
nialism, and their states remain weak with little or no legitimacy. In
this transitional environment,38 "ethnic entrepreneurs" have emerged,
using cultural identities as tools to hijack the political process and gar-
ner control and resources within the state. But Liberia and Nigeria have
had difficulty attaining "democratic governance" because ethnic entre-
preneurs foment coups and civil war to stymie the process.39
Liberia is a classic case study of ethnic entrepreneurship leading to
civil war, but against a background of what Mazrui has called
"ethnocracy"--the domination of one ethnic group over the politics and
distributions of resources within the state.' Amos Sawyer, former
head of Transitional Government in Liberia, has described the liberian
situation as one in which, without western colonialism, one hegemonic
group of expatriated slaves from the Americas (Americo-Liberians)
succeeded in creating the state and coopting the ability of local ethnic
groups to govern themselves.4' The ensuing hostilities between the
Americo-Liberians and the indigenous peoples were mediated but not
resolved by processes of intermarriage and concubinage between the
elite and the indigenous ethnic people. Meanwhile, the Americo-Liberi-
ans expanded their ties with foreign owners of capital, established a
dependency relationship with the United States, and recruited some new
indigenous members into this urban elite group.42 However, the rural
folk remained marginalized from the center of state power, and the state
accumulated more control over land and mineral resources (rubber
37. See Julius 0. Ihonvbere, The Irrelevant State, Ethnicity, and the Quest for Nationhood
in Africa, in 17 ETHNIC AND RACIM. STUDIES, at 42-60 (January 1994); S. HUNTINGTON, THE
THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 20TH CENTURY (1991); G. Hyden, Problems
and Prospects of State Coherence in Africa, in STATE VERSUS ETHNIC CLAIMS, at 74 (D.
Rothchild and V. Olorunsola eds., 1983); R. Joseph, Class, State, and Pre-Bendal Politics in
Nigeria, in 21 J. OF COMMONWEALTH AND COMPARATIVE POLITCs, at 21-38 (1983); C.
YOUNG, THE AFRICAN STATE IN COLONIAL PERSPECTIVE (1994).
38. See Rene Lemarchand, Africa's Troubled Transitions, 3 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY 98-
110 (1992).
39. Nelson Kaffir, Soldiers and Policy Makers in Nigeria, FIELDSTAFF REPORT, at 7, 3
(1977).
40. Mazrui, supra note 29, at 48.
41. See Amos Sawyer, Proprietary Authority and Local Administration in Liberia, in THE
FAILURE OF THE CENTRALIZED STATE, at 148-173 (James Wunsch and Dele Olowu eds., 1990);
A. Sawyer, The Development of Autocracy in Liberia, in RETHINKING INSTITUTIONAL AND
DEVELOPMENT (V. Ostrom, D. Feeny, and Harmut Picht eds., 1988).
42. See J. Gus LIEBENOW, LIBERIA: THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVILEGE (1969).
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plantations, gold, diamonds, etc). The coup by Samuel Doe in 1980
against the oppressive Americo-Liberian government of President
Tolbert was hailed by insiders and outsiders,43 because rural folk saw
it as freeing them from Americo-Liberian domination. Instead, Doe
became even more repressive than Tolbert as he reinforced the police,
military, and state institutions with members of his own Krahn ethnic
group, forced Americo-Liberians from their positions and property, and
fomented hostilities against the Gio and Mano groups which he per-
ceived as backing his adversaries. By the mid-1980s, most Liberians
(whether refugees abroad or citizens within the state) had come to see
the Doe regime as a "coup against the people."
The second Liberian coup and the civil war in 1990 typified the
type of situation in which strategically placed persons (often ethnic
entrepreneurs claiming to rescue their compatriots from repression) can
capture the state with the aid of external arms and young unemployed
male troops, then utilize state resources to enrich themselves while
terrorizing the public. In this case, Charles Taylor (who invaded from
Cote d'Ivoire with his NPFL forces) recruited even 10 to 15 year old
boy soldiers, and ultimately succeeded in removing and executing Presi-
dent Doe. However, Taylor set in motion a horrible civil war in which
various warlords leading regional factions emerged, claiming to defend
the interest of their ethnic members, but whose real purpose has been to
plunder, rape and rob the citizenry. The Liberian civil war has also
been an event which everyone decried, but the world (including
U.S.warships off the coast of Monrovia) initially stood by and watched,
unwilling to intervene decisively. In 1993, United Nations involvement
finally took the form of UNOMIL peacekeepers (160 military observ-
ers)" whose task was to assist the military forces of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOMOG)45 in holding the capi-
tal city Monrovia as a safe area, assisting in the establishment of condi-
tions of peace, and the disarmament of demobilization of armed fac-
tions. Nigerian troops (and to a lesser extent, Ghanaian) are the largest
43. Kieh charges the U.S. with backing the Doe regime in order to maintain a power bal-
ance in Liberia, even when it was clear that Doe was anti-democratic and repressive. See
George Klay Kieh, The Obstacles to the Peaceful Resolution of the Liberian Civil Conflict in 17
STUDiES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM, at 97-108.
44. Res. 866 U.N. SCOR, 3281st mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (1993), amended by Res. 1020
U.N. SCOR, 3592nd mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1020 (1995) (adjusting the mandate of UNOMIL).
See also Res. 1041 U.N. SCOR 3624th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1041 (1996) (extending the
mandate of UNOMIL until May 31, 1996).
45. After agreement within the Organization of African Unity to modify its relationships to
include peacekeeping operation, ECOWAS was able to constitute ECOMOG to undertake
peacekeeping operations in Liberia. ECOMOG and UNOMIL succeeded in routing the NPFL
from Monrovia in 1993. See DOCUMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (1990);
U.N. SECuRrrY COUNCIL NOTEs (November 10, 1995).
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contingents among ECOMOG forces, but these were joined periodically
by others from Kenya, Burundi, and a few other African states.
However, until 1996, UNOMIL and ECOMOG have moved slowly
against the warring factions on the interior, for varying reasons involv-
ing lack of financial resources, lack of troops, and acknowledgement of
a lack of international resolve. During my work in Monrovia in May
1994, people commented that they saw little genuine ethnic hostilities
in the fighting, but they saw situations in which warlords fomented
ethnic violence to frighten and manipulate the public.' Although the
thirteenth and supposedly final peace accord was signed on August 20,
1995, and a Transitional Government was put in place, the demobiliza-
tion of the factions has slowed down. The peace is threatened by skir-
mishes between the factions along border areas, new assaults against
UNOMIL and ECOMOG troops, and renewed assaults against civil-
ians.47 Many Liberians commented that international peacekeepers and
the returning Americo-Liberian elite who live in Monrovia do not seem
interested in stopping the fighting since life in Monrovia itself exposes
them to little danger.' As long as global responsibility remains weak,
and the Liberian civil war is perceived as an ethnic and national issue
which the Liberians themselves must resolve, then the war may drag
on.
Liberia is only one of several scenarios for ethnic conflict and civil
war. Sudan and Chad, are areas where the ethnic entrepreneurs who do
combat for the state also foment religious hostilities as one means of
heightening the competition. Many question whether Nigeria's escalat-
ing religious and ethnic tensions will be fanned into flames by the
recalcitrance of a bloated military that is insensitive to mass economic
deprivation.49 However, in Nigeria the tensions between northern Mus-
lims, southern Christians and Traditionalists is lessened by the fact that
Islamicization crosses regions (especially in the Middle Belt), but the
possibility of such conflict is always present. Although another civil
war involving southerners (Ibo or Rivers people) is unlikely, conflicts
46. 0. Mikell, USIA WORKSHOPS IN MONROVIA WITH WOMEN'S GROUPS AND NGOs (May
1994). See also G. Mikell, African Feminism: Towards a New Politics of Representation, in 21
FEMINIST STUDIES (Summer 1995).
47. See Liberia: Peace in Sight, in 36 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, at 8 end. 18 (September 8,
1995); Liberia: NPFL Commander on Fighting Between Gribos, Krahns (February 16, 1996
(FBIS-AFR-96-033 at 24)); Liberia: Monrovia Residents Stage Stay-At-Home Protests Over
Fighting (February 20, 1996 (FBIS-AFR-96-034 at 28)).
48. Interview with Elma Shaw, a Liberian female film maker and researcher who had just
returned from working in Monrovia (March 7, 1996).
49. The Nigerian military is the largest in West Africa, with 62,000 in the army, 9,500 in
the Air Force, and 5,000 in the Navy. See EIU COUNTRY PROFILE, 1996-97 at 10; See New
Christian-Muslim Violence in Nigeria, ALL AFRICA PRESS SERVICE at 10 (September 16, 1996).
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between the military government and ethnic communities and their
leaders are an ever present threat, as was evidenced recently by the
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other militant Ogoni leaders from the
oil-rich but impoverished coastal areas."
VII. RESTORING POLITICAL LEGITIMACY: LOCAL AND STATE
PROCESSES
The struggle today is to find ways of structuring the state that
allows equitable representation for traditional leaders who have cultural
legitimacy, for African Traditionalist/Islamic/ Christian communities,
and for urbanites and new elites. This must be done using new models
which allow local cultural identities to be salient but also focus on
creating and sustaining national alliances for governance.5" Thus, these
configurations must bypass older colonial-ethnic constructs while allow-
ing lower-level legitimacy to reinforce the state. This will yield a new
type of "democratic" state; but then democracy is always the adaptation
of principles to local cultural conditions.
In commenting on the possibilities for "dual political authority"
within modem African states, Sklar commented that "[iun Nigeria, a
role for traditional authority is sanctioned by the Constitution of 1989,
which permits the thirty constituent states of the Federation to establish
Traditional Councils over which traditional rulers preside." 2 Yet, he
notes that few traditional leaders have done so, although "[e]xperience
indicates that traditional institutions are more durable and resilient than
newly constructed forms of government."53 However, in today's reali-
ty, politicians often shuttle back and forth between their roles in consti-
tutional government and their positions as traditional leaders, but usual-
ly do not publicly combine them.54 When the exceptional combinations
occur, as they did with Ken Saro-Wiwa who led the campaign against
the military government and the oil interests, the government will strike
decisively against such leaders.
The recognition of the threat of dual leadership or of resistance
movements defending traditional communities and leaders has not by-
passed astute African military heads of government like Abacha. They
cling tenaciously to office, while symbolically thumbing their noses at
50. See Wole Soyinka, The Last Despot and the End of Nigerian History?, in 6 INDEX ON
CENSORSHIP, at 67-79 (1994); No Minor Matter, in 4/5 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, at 218-9 (1994).
51. See Dele Olowu, Centralization, Self-Governance, and Development in Nigeria, in THE
FAILURE OF THE CENTRALIZED STATE, at 193-227 (James S. Wunsch and Dele Olowu eds.,
1990).
52. Sklar, supra note 11, at 90.
53. Id.
54. See C. SYLVESTER WHITrAKER, THE POLITICS OF TRADITION: CONTINUITY AND
CHANGE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1946-1966 (1970).
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the westerners who attempt to apply aid, trade, or sanctions pressures
without sufficient resolve.55 However, as the pressure from the public,
the media, the elite, and western countries for a return to elected gov-
ernment have increased, many military leaders have opted for a half-
way process-a corporatist process-which still leaves them in control
of national politics. In Ghana in 1987, Flight Lieutenant Jerry J.
Rawlings (who led his second coup which established the Provisional
National Defense Council (PNDC) in December 1981) decided to allow
local elections for 110 district assemblies rather than restore the legiti-
macy of multiple parties. This gave the government the power to have
considerable influence in local politics from 1988 onward." However,
the Ghanaian situation shows that sometimes the politically invigorated
local community keeps up the pressure for national elections. In this
case, Rawlings stood for President as a civilian and won national elec-
tions in 1992, although the public contested the "free and fair" charac-
terization of the elections.57 Rawlings has been able to combine a cen-
trist military style with the outer trappings of constitutional rule which
continues to throw democratic opponents into disarray.5" Sklar con-
trasts this with Nigeria, where Abacha effectively stymied national
elections and has only recently allowed traditional leaders to return to a
role in local governance, although he has set a timetable for the return
to national democratic rule.59 He also contrast it with Botswana, where
traditional leaders are virtually locked out of roles in constitutional governance.
The question of the form that dual authority might take is one to
which political scientists will have to give further thought. Perhaps the
recent creation of new regions out of Nigeria large northern and mid-
dle-belt states might cut through the tripartite alliance configurations of
the past which have had Yoruba-Hausa-Ibo interests at the core. The
creation of 50 states which more closely approximate culturally legiti-
mate communities would mean that Muslims were divided into many
local blocks, often in combination with their ethnic/cultural compatriots
rather than with their religious compatriots. This is not a unique for-
mula, although Nigerians might deny that they have copied it from the
United States. The doubters counter with the warning that this fragmen-
tation of interests could tie the political system up in more complex
55. See IFC Pulls Out of Shell Deal in Nigeria, in BANK CHECK QUARTERLY 3 (February
1996); Nigeria: Investing for Tomorrow, in 36 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 3 (November 3, 1995).
56. Mikell, supra note 36, at 455-78.
57. See Running With Rawlings, in 36 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 4 (November 17, 1995).
58. Interview with Mrs. Hawa Yakubu, Parliamentarian for the Northern Region of Ghana.
(June 25, 1996).
59. See Sklar, supra note 11, at 92; Nigeria: Abacha Restates Regime's Desire to Hand
Over Power (February 28, 1996 (FBIS-AFR-96-040 at 22)); Nigeria: Commentary on Attempts
to Disrupt Upcoming Elections (February 28, 1996 (FBIS-AFR-96-040 at 22)).
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knots than we witnessed with the republican/democratic budgetary and
policy standoffs in the US Congress between November 1995 and Janu-
ary, 1996.
However, the major reason for the resistance of military leaders
and authoritarian Presidents to dual authority represented by dual polit-
ical systems is that they fear the power of the public over their ability
to use public office for private gain. Joseph (1987) has pointed to these
pre-Bendal tendencies in the authoritarian governments in Nigeria,'
and the same analysis could be made of resistance in Zaire, Kenya,
Liberia, and many other areas. What if the traditional "responsibilities"
of office were emphasized as a counter to elite privilege, as is custom-
ary in African traditional political ideology.6 The power of the public
to insist upon transparency in governance and decision making would
limit the capacity of rulers to enrich themselves through use of state
resources. Such considerations lead many authoritarian leaders to distort
and evade discussions of cultural approaches to governance.
We should no longer accept the reason that military and authoritar-
ian leaders frequently give for resisting democratization: the fear that
"identity politics" 62 or "ethnic nationalism '63 would distort the politi-
cal process and lead to "tribal" animosities and religious violence. They
warn against possible Islamic alliances against other ethnic and reli-
gious groups. But the reality is that many factions and sub-groups exist
within most ethnic and religious groupings,' so that the possibilities of
amalgamation against other ethnic constituencies may grow less over
time. The time has come to redefine the conditions for African political
participation, by looking again at the arguments for cultural relativism
and against abstract universalism65 in our approaches to African gover-
nance.
60. See RICHARD JOSEPH, DEMOCRACY AND PRE-BENDAL POLITICS IN NIGERIA (1987).
61. See Makua wa Mama, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprints: An
Evaluation of the Language of Duties 35 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1995).
62. IDENTITY POLITICS: ISLAM AND FEMINIST CULTURAL REASSERTIONS (Valentine
Moghodam ed., 1994).
63. This has been discussed more in Asian case studies (in particular for J.S. Fumival-like
"plural societies" created under colonial conditions) than for African societies, where pre-co-
lonial social compacts existed between groups. For examples regarding Sri Lankan or Tamil na-
tionalism, See DAVID LITrLE, SRI LANKA: THE INVENTION OF ENMITY (1994); JANE RUSSELL,
COMMUNAL POLITICS UNDER THE DONOUGHMORE CONSTITUTION, 1931-47 (1983); M.G.
SMITH, THE PLURAL SoCIETY IN THE CARIBBEAN (1965).
64. See Ghana: Regional Security Council Meets to Discuss Muslim Dispute (February 20,
1996 (FBIS-AFR-96-034, at 27)).
65. See James S. Coleman & C.R.D. Halisi, American Political Science and Tropical Afri-
ca: Universalism versus Relativism, 28 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEw 25-62 (1988).
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